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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE 
HOW TO THINK ABOUT ERRORS, COSTS, AND THEIR ALLOCATION 
Ronald J. Allen

 
There is an ongoing, robust debate about the structure of litigation, 
and in particular, about access to the courts. For a considerable period 
of time, the mantra that the courts should be readily available to all the 
people so that people may present claims that their rights have been 
violated has dominated academic discourse and has, perhaps, 
significantly influenced the structure of litigation.
1
 This conventional 
view—that the courts should be freely open to all—was dealt a blow by 
the Iqbal
2
 and Twombly
3
 decisions, which imposed greater gatekeeping 
responsibilities on the federal district courts. These decisions 
predictably provoked a storm of protest, in large measure because they 
may indeed make it more difficult for many petitioners to have their 
petitions considered on the merits.
4
 But whether that result is a social 
harm or a social good depends on matters aside from simply winnowing 
the field of potential disputants—a point neglected by much of 
contemporary civil procedure scholarship. That scholarship has placed a 
laser-like focus on facilitating the bringing of claims, and in doing so, 
has made two serious errors: first, the scholarship fails to consider that 
litigation is but one small part of a larger social optimization problem; 
and second, the scholarship has a peculiar conception of errors and 
costs, including how to allocate those errors and costs. This brief Article 
provides the analytical background to these assertions. 
“Primary behavior” and “litigation behavior” are conventionally 
thought of as distinct spheres with internal logics of their own. The 
former articulates rules governing everyday actions—from social 
interaction to structuring efficient economic behavior—and the latter 
governs the peculiar set of actions involved in litigation. Facilitating 
appropriate primary behavior is the overriding goal of social 
organization, and one of its main tools is substantive law. Litigation 
behavior is the effort to resolve disputes about inappropriate primary 
behavior or to reestablish the status quo following disruptions of the 
social fabric. 
                                                                                                                     
  John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University; President, Board of 
Foreign Advisors, Evidence Law and Forensic Science Institute, China University of Political 
Science and Law. 
 1. See Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010). 
 2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 4. See, e.g., Symposium, Reflections on Iqbal: Discerning Its Rule, Grappling with Its 
Implications, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1143 passim (2010). 
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Resources devoted to litigation appear to most legal commentators 
as wasted resources—adding no value to society. Since litigation itself 
does not produce any useful good, litigation should obtain correct 
results as efficiently as possible. These aspirations are reflected in Rule 
1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the rules of 
civil procedure “should be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”5 These aspirations also appear in Rule 102 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: “These rules should be construed so as to administer 
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the 
truth and securing a just determination.”6 The principle animating these 
provisions is equal access to justice, particularly that even the indigent 
should not be disadvantaged when facing a wealthy adversary. 
Regrettably, life, as always, is complicated. Costs cannot be eliminated, 
and thus, the most important question is how to allocate those costs. 
Primary behavior does not produce goods cost-free; producing 
goods creates waste products and risks harm to others. Naturally, 
reducing production costs encourages production, whereas raising costs 
has the opposite effect. Thus, if the producer can externalize some of its 
cost (for example, by dumping waste in a river or on a neighbor’s 
property), the producer’s actual cost of the good will not reflect its true 
social cost, which means—with regard to social utility—there will 
likely be overproduction of the good in question. By contrast, optimal 
production of social goods is facilitated by ensuring production at true 
social cost. This equilibrium is why it is important for the substantive 
law to align costs with behavior. 
Litigation costs are generally believed to be socially perverse 
because they act as a tax on productive behavior. To some extent, this 
belief is true, but a costless legal regime would stimulate the production 
of its product—litigation—and possibly result in too much litigation. 
Although this may appear counterintuitive, one should remember that 
parties must make decisions as to how to dispute—in simple terms, 
whether to sue or negotiate. Everyone comes into contact and potential 
conflict with numerous people. Perhaps a neighbor plays music too 
loudly or neglects to dispose of trash correctly. If litigation were 
costless one would simply sue rather than negotiate.
7
 The costs of 
litigation affect the manner in which people relate, and those effects can be 
beneficial or perverse. The costs of litigation, in short, may counterintuitively 
                                                                                                                     
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 6. FED. R. EVID. 102.  
 7. When transaction costs for private negotiation and settlement are relatively low, 
parties will negotiate with each other to resolve conflicts. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/1
2012] HOW TO THINK ABOUT ERRORS, COSTS, AND THEIR ALLOCATION 887 
 
produce social goods through the incentive effects they create for alternative 
modes of disputing. 
The precise policy prescriptions following a deeper understanding 
of the problem of social cost are ambiguous, because they depend, in 
part, on the relative values of resolving different kinds of disputes in 
different ways. It may be sensible to guide certain types of disputes 
toward formal dispute resolution and to guide others away from it. 
Maybe commercial disputes differ from family disputes, and maybe 
discrete commercial transactions systemically differ from antitrust 
actions. Life, in short, is complicated, and one of the tasks for the legal 
system is sorting out that complexity. 
The history of both the Federal Rules of Procedure and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence reflect, at least implicitly, these analytical points; Congress 
enacted them in part to offset what it believed to be distorting aspects of the 
systems that they replaced.
8
 Lawmakers believed the previous systems 
disadvantaged plaintiffs by raising their costs much too high.
9
 The 
solution to this problem was to simplify pleading requirements and to 
allow cases to proceed to what pundits believed would be low-cost 
discovery, followed by low-cost trials.
10
 Discovery costs would be low 
because the assumption was that both parties shared knowledge of the 
typical cases, and thus, a substantial investment in discovery would not 
be required. In addition, both parties would have the incentive to keep 
costs of discovery to their necessary minimum. It is immediately 
obvious how these conceptions map onto the previous analytical points. 
“In a world of symmetrical information and low transaction 
costs . . . the Federal Rules most likely accomplished the goal of 
facilitating the accurate and efficient resolution of disputes without 
distorting the underlying substantive law, values that the procedural 
regime the Federal Rules replaced did not adequately secure.”11 If the 
original assumptions about litigation are true, procedural wrangling 
serves no purpose.
12
 Moreover, costs were not, and could not be, 
lowered to zero, so there remained reciprocal incentives to avoid 
litigation through other means of resolving disputes. 
One should note the historical contingency of the era that adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It involved substantive assumptions about 
the relative positions of plaintiffs and defendants that were empirically true 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: 
Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 7–8 (2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 11–12. 
 12. Id. at 12. 
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but not logically entailed.
13
 Thus, changes in the relative positions of 
plaintiff and defendant from the pre-Rules situation may justify changes 
in the procedural context, which could entail, among other things, a 
reallocation of costs.
14
 Perhaps originally, the procedural regime 
favored defendants and thus subsidized socially wasteful activity; 
however, now, in some set of cases, perhaps this regime favors 
plaintiffs with the opposite effect.
15
 
In such cases, defendants will be deterred from productive 
activities, not by the law, but by litigation
 
costs that 
increase the in terrorum [sic] value of even meritless suits 
that put pressure on a defendant to settle and burden 
otherwise lawful conduct. Potential defendants will engage 
in litigation avoidance tactics that are likely to be socially 
wasteful, and they will settle to avoid litigation costs rather 
than risk liability on the merits.
16
 
The high price of litigation increases the cost of socially useful activity 
that is indistinguishable from socially costly activity at an acceptable 
price through litigation.
17
 The alternative is to buy peace through 
settlements even though the underlying primary behavior is perfectly 
acceptable. The effect is a tax on useful behavior. 
To generalize, the legal system must take into account the 
interactive effects of primary behavior and litigation behavior. The 
effects or consequences of primary behavior on litigation behavior are 
often noted, but litigation behavior affects primary behavior as well.
18
 
This means that the regulatory problem is unlikely to be solved by 
simple slogans such as those concerning access to court. Before 
addressing how to approach regulating such a complex problem, 
another issue involving the inadequacy of the conventional 
understandings of the litigation matrix needs to be addressed. In 
addition to inadequately considering the relationship between primary 
behavior and litigation behavior, the conventional conception of an 
error is inadequate. 
The conventional conception of an error is composed of two parts: 
denying a petitioner access to an adjudication on the merits (through 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 11–13. 
 14. Id. at 13–14. 
 15. Id. at 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence 
on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 547–48 (2010) (arguing that evidentiary concerns 
about prospective litigation have pervasive effects on primary behavior). 
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narrowing the courthouse door)
19
 and a belief that Type I (false 
positive) and Type II (false negative) errors
20
 are roughly equivalent. 
These parts add up to suggest that the procedural goals should be to 
treat parties roughly equally and to minimize total errors.
21
 Although 
these ways of thinking have been around for a considerable period, it is 
plain that they suffer from serious defects. 
First, an error is made each time an undeserving litigant imposes 
costs on an adversary, a point that seems, rather remarkably, to have 
been neglected by those who complain of the Supreme Court’s recent 
forays into procedural matters. The image of the federal court system 
(or any other court system, for that matter) being constantly open and 
easily accessible for all neglects that walking through the courthouse 
door by a plaintiff imposes costs on a defendant. If the defendant has 
behaved inappropriately by reference to the substantive law, the 
defendant should bear these costs. But as elaborated above, if the 
defendant has not behaved inappropriately by reference to that same 
substantive law—if a plaintiff’s claim is unjustified—the costs imposed 
on defendants are errors that create taxes on productive behavior and 
thus are likely socially perverse. This point is so obvious that it needs 
little further elaboration. An undeserving plaintiff deprives a deserving 
defendant of its assets, and the best-case scenario is that the deserving 
defendant passes those costs on to a hapless public. The best-case 
scenario, in short, is decidedly unappealing. The point, of course, is that 
the conventional view seems dominated by the belief that there are no 
wrongful complaints filed, which is ludicrous. More importantly, in an 
era of asymmetrical costs, where filing a complaint can generate 
enormous costs for the defendant, the defendant will be consistently in 
the position discussed above, having to minimize extra costs attached to 
socially useful behavior, and having to pass whatever costs it cannot 
avoid on to someone else, if possible. 
There is a second fundamental error in the conventional thinking 
about errors. It focuses on just two of the decisions that a court can 
reach at trial—an error for one side or the other—but there are four 
possible outcomes at trial, and all have social benefits or costs. In 
addition to errors, correct decisions are possible. Neglecting correct 
decisions is peculiar. For example, in civil cases, the error equalization 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Miller, supra note 1, at 9–10 (discussing how changes in litigation strategy and 
judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules have influenced a “retreat from the principles of 
citizen access” to courts). 
 20. For more on Type I and Type II errors in connection with pleading standards, see 
Allen & Guy, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 21. See, e.g., David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: 
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 
488, 496–500 (1982). 
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policy is satisfied by making errors in every single case, so long as the 
base rates of cases that go to trial include roughly the same number of 
deserving plaintiffs and defendants. 
The relationship between the four possible outcomes at trial and 
procedural regulation is itself more complicated than it appears on the 
surface. In general, without knowledge of the base rates of deserving 
parties that go to trial and the relationship between the assessments of 
fact-finders and true states of affairs, there is literally no way to predict 
the effect of procedural regulation on correct or incorrect decisions. For 
example, implicit in the conventional discourse is that a finding that the 
probability of liability is 0.8 means that in eight out of ten similar cases, 
the true facts are consistent with liability. However, there could be any 
relationship between fact-finders’ findings of probability and true states 
of affairs. In the set of all cases where fact-finders find a 0.8 probability 
of liability, it could be true that all cases in that subset are cases fact-
finders should find no liability. Similarly, if everyone who goes to trial 
is guilty or liable, there can be no convictions of the innocent or 
mistakes against deserving plaintiffs, no matter how low the standard of 
proof, and vice versa. 
The conventional discourse on procedural regulation also assumes a 
static system, whereas in fact it is dynamic. One aspect of this 
dynamism is that parties decide which cases to take further into the 
procedural system and can adjust their decision in light of changes in 
the rules. Thus, the simple assumption that changing the burden of 
pleading or persuasion, or any other part of procedure, causes more 
errors of one kind than another, or any other suggested cause-and-effect 
relationship between regulations and outcomes, is obviously not 
analytically true; it depends on how the system responds to the change.
 
 
The combined effect of the neglect of the interactive relationship 
between primary and litigation behavior and the curious conception of 
an error is obvious. The result is to obscure the fact that trial decisions 
are only one part of the output of the legal system. Parties negotiate 
outcomes in both civil and criminal cases. They do so in the shadow of 
trials (among other things), but the outcomes in those cases are 
obviously part of the total social welfare effects of a legal system. In 
addition, parties make those decisions in a dynamic, not a static, 
environment, which leads to the question how to regulate such complex 
processes most effectively. 
In the abstract, the answer is clear. How to translate the abstractions 
into feasible regulation is another matter. First, the abstract answer is 
addressed in the quote below from my recent Meador Lecture, which is 
followed by my further reflections on social optimization of the 
procedural system: 
6
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[T]he reality of the legal system is that it is not a nice, tidy, 
simple, and static context but instead is a bubbling cauldron 
of messy, complicated, organic, evolutionary processes. 
The standard tool used to regulate this bubbling mess is 
rules, and it is the friction between that tool and many of 
the uses to which it is put that explains in general why fact-
finding and legal regulation are viewed as so often 
problematic. This same relationship is explanatory of many 
legal puzzles, such as, in ascending order of importance, 
the curious implications of standard legal error analysis, the 
rules versus standards debate, and the meaning of “law.” 
The simple concept of a rule as setting necessary or 
sufficient conditions from which outcomes may be deduced 
is an example of monotonic logic in which the addition of 
postulates or assumptions simply adds to what may be 
deduced from the previous assumptions. Monotonic logics 
are powerful tools, as the rise of modern mathematics and 
the success of many scientific fields demonstrate. They 
work best when their operant assumptions accurately 
capture their domains, which means they work quite well, 
in Hayek’s famous dichotomy, in made systems such as 
games, and less well in grown or organic systems, which 
typify much of the human condition. A large part of debate 
over rules and their limits is often implicitly about the 
complexity of the relevant domain and one’s tolerance for 
mistakes of different kinds. As the number of pertinent 
variables increases or when some of them are continuous 
rather than discrete, the deductive problem quickly 
becomes computationally intractable, even for computers 
let alone humans. And of course if a new variable pops up 
that was not previously anticipated, all deductive bets are 
off, as it were. In either case (computational intractability 
or failure of imagination), algorithmic approaches that rely 
on extant rules generate the standard critiques of the 
indeterminate nature of rules. In reality, it is not that rules 
are indeterminate but that they are being put to a task for 
which they are not optimal.
22
 
That lecture suggested that the central problem of the legal system is 
similar to the central problem of rationality, which is the taming of 
complexity. In both cases, simple deductive tools were being put to uses 
that were suboptimal. That raises the important question of what other 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 
1060 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
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approaches may be more fruitful. Inspired by a brilliant article by an 
artificial intelligence researcher, Tim van Gelder, I explored one 
possible answer. The struggle of rationality to tame complexity may be 
less like digital computation and more akin to a dynamic regulator, such 
as the Watt Centrifugal Governor that was a critical part of the 
Industrial Revolution.
23
 Analogously, legal analysis may need to evolve 
to deal with the complexities of systems. Van Gelder’s example is a 
metaphor rather than an argument for my purposes, for it provides just 
the suggestion of possibilities rather than a defined research program. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting. 
The dynamic regulator solved a very interesting problem. The 
growth of the textile industry in England depended upon a consistent 
energy source with very limited variability.
24
 The steam engine 
provided the energy but its pistons provided episodic bursts of energy 
rather than a smooth, continuous stream.
25
 Flywheels were helpful, but 
still not adequate. As van Gelder made clear, one potential solution to 
this problem is computational: 
1. Measure the speed of the flywheel. 
2. Compare the actual speed against the desired speed. 
3. If there is no discrepancy, return to step 1. 
  Otherwise, 
  a. measure the current steam pressure; 
  b. calculate the desired alteration in steam pressure; 
  c. calculate the necessary throttle valve adjustment. 
4. Make the throttle valve adjustment. 
5. Return to step 1.
26
 
Unfortunately, this computational solution requires a costly person 
doing it, and it will rarely produce a smooth enough source of energy.
27
 
Scottish engineer James Watt solved this problem by placing movable 
arms on a spindle at the center of the flywheel. The flywheel’s motion 
was instantaneously transmitted to the valve regulating the flow of 
steam.
28
 As the rotation of the flywheel speeds up, the arms extend, 
which transmits energy to the valve and closes it until the proper 
equilibrium is reached, and vice versa. 
 Regardless whether the centrifugal regulator captures something 
important about rationality, viewing the legal system with this metaphor 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Tim van Gelder, What Might Cognition Be, if Not Computation?, 92 J. PHIL. 345 
(1995). 
 24. Id. at 347. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 348. 
 27. Id. at 347. 
 28. Id. at 349. 
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in mind may be fruitful. The most dramatic point is that some problems 
can be solved other than through deductive arguments or simple rules; 
the contrary belief is a consistent constraint on legal scholarship 
generally. It is undoubtedly useful to break problems down into smaller 
parts, and so on, but at the same time that process can be 
counterproductive, disguising rather than highlighting the nature of the 
entity under examination. The alternative is to think of the legal system 
more, perhaps, like fluid dynamics treats the flow of liquids and gases, 
to embrace, in other words, the messiness of real life rather than abstract 
it away. 
How does this apply in the procedural context? Telling trial judges 
to behave as centrifugal regulators in order to optimize social 
productivity is probably not likely to yield satisfactory results. The 
second-best solution would be to assign the true costs of parties’ actions 
to them. However, it is impossible to determine—practically and maybe 
theoretically—the “true” costs of litigation behavior. For example, 
when I ask for discovery, I may be trying to build my case or respond to 
the opponent’s case. I should be responsible for building my case, but 
responding to my opponent’s case perhaps is a cost that he should bear. 
When a lawyer cross-examines, whose costs are those? If it is pointing 
out the limits of the adversary’s case, he should bear those costs; but if 
through cross-examination I am building my case, I should bear those 
costs. How could procedural law sort these different effects into the 
categories that are useful for one side or the other? A crude rule—
opposing party pays for my costs of cross-examination—leads to 
obvious potential manipulation. Nor is adopting a British-style loser- 
pays system an obvious solution. Recent empirical work shows both 
that simple predictions about the effect of a loser-pays system are likely 
false (in fact, it can increase transaction costs), and that people do not 
opt for the English rule in contract negotiations.
29
 
Alternatively, the objective could be to structure the process so that the 
parties have the incentive to properly allocate costs, with, when necessary, 
the involvement of the trial judge. That objective would involve categorical 
cost allocation, with the possibility of relief from the trial judge. One 
category probably ripe for such treatment is discovery costs. Discovery 
costs generally benefit the party asking for the discovery, and discovery 
has been a cause of considerable injustice because of increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Kong-Pin Chen & Jue-Shyan Wang, Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency 
Fees, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 519, 522–23 (2007); Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, the Modified British Rule, 
and Civil Litigation Reform, 1 MICH. L. & POL. REV. 73, 74 (1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An Empirical Study of 
Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts 1 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 10-52, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706054. 
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asymmetric allocation.
30
 Plaintiffs, simply by filing, can impose 
enormous costs on defendants while bearing virtually none 
themselves.
31
 One should note how far from the original conceptions 
giving rise to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the modern condition 
may be. If each side will have about the same amount of discovery 
costs, it makes perfect sense to let each side bear their own costs. That 
is identical to cost shifting, and any resources spent in shifting costs are 
simply wasted. Asymmetric costs, by contrast, cause skewed cost 
allocation and provide the opportunity for strategic exploitation. By 
contrast, placing the costs of discovery provisionally on the person 
asking for it, but allowing for judicial involvement to make adjustments, 
may both generally give incentives for the optimal production of 
information and permit a safety valve in the unusual case. 
Although the possibilities are diverse, an example of an “unusual” 
case would be where there is good reason to believe that an adversary is 
acting strategically, primarily to impose costs. In such a case, the 
“benefit” is to the adversary, and that is who should bear the costs. The 
optimal cost shifting would be accomplished by petitioning the trial 
judge for relief. In making such determinations, the adversarial process 
will construct the judge’s decision, and the parties will have the correct 
incentives to educate the trial judge. This is not a guarantee of 
perfection, but it provides some hope for reasonable outcomes. It 
exploits the advantages of both an initial “bear your own costs” scheme 
with the apparent inertia of trial courts that do not want to get involved 
with cost allocation or discovery regulation unless forced to do so. 
Courts would be forced to be involved only when the situation was 
egregious enough to justify a well-grounded petition for relief. 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1989) 
 31. Id. 
10
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